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THE DRAMAS OF CRIMINAL LAW: 
THURMAN ARNOLD’S POST-REALIST CRITIQUE 
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Mark Fenster* 
The high legal realist period of the 1930s was not known for its criminal law 
scholarship, while until fairly recently, criminal law theory was not as well-developed 
as those fields that had faced a realist and post-realist critique. This Essay attempts 
to address these issues by describing in detail the criminal law scholarship of 
Thurman Arnold, a prominent realist whose best known academic writings were his 
mid-1930s monographs on the New Deal and resistance to it. Arnold’s criminal law 
scholarship serves as a forgotten link between the classical doctrinal work that 
dominated midcentury legal academic work on criminal law and the more socially 
and culturally-focused scholarship of recent decades. Reconsidering Arnold’s 
sociological, doctrinal, and cultural analysis of criminal law, law enforcement, and 
the criminal trial informs our understanding of the history of criminal law 
scholarship, legal realism, and post-realist legal theory. 
 
Only if we recognize that the chief function of the criminal court is not to enforce 
law but to dramatize law enforcement do we have a sensible basis for understanding 
or reform.1   
– Thurman Arnold (1932) 
INTRODUCTION 
In a symposium commentary published twenty-five years ago, Robert Weisberg 
observed that criminal law scholarship remained stuck in a pre-modern phase, having 
failed to suffer the realist and positivist critiques that other fields of legal scholarship had 
faced.2 Focused largely on doctrinal analysis that resisted both theory and empirics, 
Weisberg complained, the field was a dull backwater in the legal academy because it had, 
among other things, failed to confront the implications of legal realism’s insights.3 The 
generation since Weisberg’s pronouncement—including but by no means defined by the 
                                                          
      *   Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Hazouri & Roth Tort Professor and University Term Professor, Frederic 
G. Levin College of Law, University of Florida. Many thanks to Jack Schlegel and Bob Gordon for 
conversations and encouragement; thanks also to Chris Slobogin, Jerry Israel, and Bob Weisberg. 
 1. Thurman W. Arnold, Law Enforcement—An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. 1, 24 
(1932). 
 2. Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, Criminology, and the Small World of Legal Scholars, 63 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 521, 522 (1992). 
 3. Id. 
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works of Paul Butler,4 Bernard Harcourt,5 and Tracey Meares6—has more thoroughly 
rethought criminal law’s place within a larger social context and produced more 
compelling and contemporary theoretical works. Their social and cultural analysis of 
crime, law enforcement, and punishment hearkens back to a small, but during its time, 
well-read body of criminal law scholarship from legal realism’s heyday in the 1930s: 
Thurman Arnold’s cultural legal realist work on criminal law.7 
Arnold’s criminal law scholarship imported insights from the emerging qualitative 
social sciences of the early twentieth century, an enormously influential period of 
intellectual ferment,8 to supplement legal realism’s nascent critical method. Arnold was 
not considered a criminal law scholar—his greatest fame as an academic was as a realist 
who defended the New Deal’s administrative practices, while he is now best-remembered 
as head of antitrust enforcement in the Justice Department in the late 1930s and as a named, 
founding partner of one of Washington’s most prominent private firms.9 Nevertheless, he 
authored or co-authored law review articles, books, and government-sponsored studies 
that reconsidered a subject that was dominated during the pre-World War II era by staid 
doctrinal scholarship. Viewed broadly, Arnold’s work on criminal law sheds light not only 
                                                          
 4. See PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE (2009); Paul Butler, Racially Based 
Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995). 
 5. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF 
NATURAL ORDER (2011); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN 
WINDOWS POLICING (2001). 
 6. See TRACEY L. MEARES & DAN M. KAHAN, URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY 
COMMUNITIES (1999); Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-
and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159 (2015); Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. 
Harcourt, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809 (2011). 
 7. Arnold’s criminal law scholarship only gets occasional mention in recent scholarship. See, e.g., Guyora 
Binder & Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1168 (1997) (quoting Arnold and 
relying upon his analogy of the criminal trial to drama); Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity 
Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 520 n.210 (2006) (characterizing The Symbols of Government as a 
“celebrated essay” while borrowing Arnold’s notion of the criminal trial as a dramatization); Kenneth B. Nunn, 
The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial Criminal Process—A Critique of the Role of 
the Public Defender and a Proposal for Reform, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 761 n.90 (1995) (praising Arnold’s 
“brilliant work outside of the critical tradition”). As Weisberg notes, contemporary scholars who follow in 
Arnold’s culturalist tradition are either ignorant of his work or fail to cite him. See Robert Weisberg, Norms and 
Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467, 558 (2003) 
(criticizing Dan Kahan for this omission in his article, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
413 (1999)). 
 8. See DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 303–469 (1991); Dorothy Ross, 
Modernist Social Science in the Land of the New/Old, in MODERNIST IMPULSES IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 1870–
1930, at 171 (Dorothy Ross ed., 1994). 
 9. The lone biography of Arnold is SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY (2005), 
which covers his life and career; Arnold’s autobiography, which is not terribly revealing, is FAIR FIGHTS AND 
FOUL: A DISSENTING LAWYER’S LIFE (1965). Additional sources of biographical information focused on his 
academic career and his academic work include LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960 (1986); 
Douglas Ayer, In Quest of Efficiency: The Ideological Journey of Thurman Arnold in the Interwar Period, 23 
STAN. L. REV. 1049 (1971); Neil Duxbury, Some Radicalism About Realism? Thurman Arnold and the Politics 
of Modern Jurisprudence, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 11 (1990); Mark Fenster, The Symbols of Governance: 
Thurman Arnold and Post-Realist Legal Theory, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 1053 (2003) [hereinafter Fenster, Symbols of 
Governance]; Robert W. Gordon, Professors and Policymakers: Yale Law School Faculty in the New Deal and 
After, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL: THE TERCENTENNIAL LECTURES 75, 86–87, 108–10 (Anthony T. 
Kronman ed., 2004). See also Mark Fenster, The Folklore of Legal Biography, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1265 (2007) 
(reviewing WALLER, supra, and discussing additional sources of information about Arnold). 
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on the possibility of criminal law scholarship beyond doctrinal analysis—possibilities that 
the current generation has more thoroughly realized—but on an important strain of post-
realist legal theory. 
Like most other realists, Arnold focused on how law functioned within society and 
its consequences on systems of state and private governance, but he distinguished himself 
from his colleagues by emphasizing law’s symbolic functions as well as its instrumental 
consequences.10 As public law that defines and enforces substantive prohibitions, criminal 
law and procedure represented for Arnold core subjects for his inquiry into law, politics, 
and the state. And although it is doctrinally, procedurally, and administratively complex, 
criminal law and the criminal justice system are the areas of law to which the public and 
press pay the greatest attention. As a result, they served as an especially good means for 
Arnold to think through the relationship between popular sentiment on the one hand and 
law and the state that enforces it on the other. Writing in the midst of and after Prohibition, 
Arnold examined how the public sought to understand and affect criminal justice through 
political and moral debate. Arnold was not uninterested in the doctrinal and administrative 
complexity of criminal law and procedure—his first major law review article, written 
during his initial year-long visit to Yale, waded into the morass that was (and remains) the 
law of criminal attempt. But he sought to understand why the law and the legal system 
appeared convoluted, how the public responded to the state’s legal opacity, and how legal 
and political institutions sought to maintain their legitimacy while balancing the need for 
protecting individual rights, administering an overburdened criminal justice system, and 
enforcing—or appearing to enforce—the law. 
Arnold’s criminal law scholarship is presently worthy of reconsideration for several 
reasons. First, it helps complete our understanding of criminal law scholarship’s past, 
filling a gap in its history by establishing a link between legal realism and contemporary 
interdisciplinary work engaged in the social and cultural study of criminal law. Second, 
Arnold’s heterodox version of realist scholarship helps complicate our understanding of 
legal realism—arguably the most important and influential movement in twentieth century 
legal theory. But Arnold was as interested in thinking about law’s broader relationship to 
the social world as he was in the jurisprudential questions that have come to define 
contemporary debates about realism.11 As I have argued elsewhere, he simultaneously 
offered a distinct type of realism, a critique of realism, and the first effort to use legal 
realism’s insights for a broader understanding of law’s place in modern governance.12 
Third, Arnold’s criminal law scholarship furthers our understanding of Arnold’s work—
                                                          
 10. On realism’s functionalism, see Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 822 (1935); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 59 
(1984). On Arnold’s relationship to realism’s functionalism, see Fenster, Symbols of Governance, supra note 9, 
at 1061–66. 
 11. See Daniel R. Ernst, The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 102 YALE L.J. 
1019, 1073 (1993) (book review) (noting how Arnold’s work “confounds” received understandings of legal 
realism). For examples of recent prominent work that emphasizes realism’s jurisprudential strain, see BRIAN 
LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY (2007); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS 
IN JUDGING (2009). For a critique of the latter work, see Mark Fenster, Mr. Peabody’s Improbable Legal 
Intellectual History, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 101 (2016). 
 12. See Fenster, Symbols of Governance, supra note 9, at 1067–72. 
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work that continues to influence scholarship in fields as diverse as antitrust,13 corporate 
law,14 and administrative law.15 
This Essay begins in Part I with an introduction to Arnold and to his relatively brief 
academic career and post-academic success, before proceeding through the various stages 
of his criminal law scholarship: from his empirical work at West Virginia and Yale (Part 
II), through his realist doctrinal scholarship (Part III) and his institutional critique of law 
enforcement (Part IV), into his broader cultural critique of the criminal trial (Part V), and 
then, as a conclusion and postscript, to how he applied his theoretical work to his period 
serving as a federal appellate judge on the D.C. Circuit (Part VI). In the latter part, I note 
that Judge Arnold served in the role that Professor Arnold prescribed—and ultimately 
found it so unsatisfying that he fled the bench for the more interesting and open world of 
high-level private practice. 
I. THURMAN ARNOLD’S ACADEMIC CAREER 
Arnold entered the academy after several years of private practice in Chicago and 
his hometown of Laramie, Wyoming.16 He quickly rose to prominence as an academic, 
starting as dean of West Virginia’s law school, where he led the bar and faculty in a 
thorough, quantitative study of legal procedure in the local and state courts.17 He arrived 
at Yale, initially in the summer of 1928 and then for a year-long visit in 1930, in great part 
to join its dean, Charles Clark, and young faculty recruit from Columbia, William O. 
Douglas, in their empirical study of the criminal docket in the Connecticut federal courts, 
as part of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (popularly 
known as the Wickersham Commission).18 Around the same time, Harvard’s Dean Roscoe 
Pound attempted to woo Arnold away from New Haven to initiate a quantitative project 
on criminal law at Harvard.19 Looking to fill gaps in their faculty and compete for 
empirical researchers at the moment that quantitative methodologies’ stock was high, 
talent-spotting administrators were coming after Arnold. 
                                                          
 13. See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust Legacy of Thurman Arnold, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 569 
(2004) (arguing that Arnold “revitalized antitrust law and enforcement and changed the entire focus of the New 
Deal from corporatist planning to competition as the fundamental economic policy of the Roosevelt 
administration”); Tony A. Freyer, What Was Warren Court Antitrust?, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 359–69 (noting 
Arnold’s continuing relevance). 
 14. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 B.U. L. REV. 
1997, 2028 (2014) (characterizing Arnold as “one of the great figures in American law” and using his work on 
law as folklore and symbol as the basis of their analysis). 
 15. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Birth of a “Logical System”: Thurman Arnold and the Making of Modern 
Administrative Law, 84 OR. L. REV. 69 (2005) (arguing that Arnold’s work represents a key tradition in 
administrative law scholarship); Michael Taggart, The Province of Administrative Law Determined?, in THE 
PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1, 2–3 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997) (using Arnold’s work to help explain 
contemporary administrative law). 
 16. See WALLER, supra note 9, at 22–38. 
 17. See id. at 39–43. For his account of the work he did at West Virginia, see Thurman Arnold, Review of the 
Work of the College of Law, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 319 (1930); T. W. Arnold, The Collection of Judicial Statistics in 
West Virginia, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 184 (1930). 
 18. See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 82–90 
(1995). 
 19. Letter from Thurman Arnold to Roscoe Pound, Dean, Harvard Law School (Jan. 23, 1931), reprinted in 
VOLTAIRE AND THE COWBOY: THE LETTERS OF THURMAN ARNOLD 176–78 (Gene M. Gressley ed., 1977). 
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But what we would now recognize as the naïve quantitative methodologies of the 
early twentieth century did not hold Arnold’s attention for long, and within a few years he 
would begin to mock the meaningless “mass of statistics” that he had collected, developing 
a set of stock jokes about nerdy bean counters and their work that he would continue to 
deploy throughout his career.20 His published works during his academic career varied, 
and he did not concentrate on any one field of substantive law early in his career. In the 
seven-year period between his first major law review article and the publication of his 
second book, The Folklore of Capitalism, in 1937, he wrote about criminal law, criminal 
procedure, civil procedure, trusts, administrative law, and jurisprudence, among other 
things. As Spencer Waller has characterized it, Arnold’s earliest reputation was that of an 
“academic entrepreneur,” energetic and desirous of attention for West Virginia’s law 
school, for which he had high intellectual and educational aspirations as the flagship (and 
only) law school in the state.21 He abandoned West Virginia for Yale, and he abandoned 
quantitative research for doctrinal criticism as he moved along a trajectory toward the 
broader social criticism for which he would gain a popular audience. To extend Waller’s 
apt entrepreneur metaphor, Arnold always tried to gain market share to stay ahead of his 
competition.22 
Although he may have abandoned systematic empirical research, he used the results 
of his earlier quantitative work in some of his new, more impressionistic work, and the 
objects of his earlier study, as well as the notion that some empirical reality about crime 
and society lurked beneath the doctrinal gloss of criminal law, remained important to his 
writings. Two of his first four major academic articles concerned criminal law and 
procedure (while a third considered procedure more broadly in its relationship to 
substantive law);23 and one of his criminal law articles made reference to the “law in 
action” that he and his collaborators found in their work for the Wickersham 
Commission.24 The criminal justice system—which was not one of realism’s major foci, 
although it was one of Dean Pound’s25—would remain one of Arnold’s interests 
throughout his academic career. He returned to it in new material in The Symbols of 
Government26 and even during his brief period on the federal bench, when he was forced 
to consider the issue of criminal insanity and mens rea about which he had written a decade 
                                                          
 20. In his autobiography, for example, Arnold mocked his own work on the Connecticut courts: “The result 
was the most fascinating body of legal statistics that has been collected in this century. They had only one flaw. 
Nobody then and nobody yet has ever been able to think of what to do with them.” ARNOLD, supra note 9, at 63. 
Arnold was not the only one; Karl Llewellyn would later characterize Underhill Moore’s study of parking 
patterns as “the nadir of idiocy.” Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Research Worthwhile, 8 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 399, 401 (1956). 
 21. WALLER, supra note 9, at 39–44. 
 22. One could go so far as to say that Arnold’s continually shifting gaze manifested “the attention span of a 
two-year-old.” John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale 
Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459, 512 n.264 (1979). 
 23. These include Arnold, Law Enforcement, supra note 1, and Thurman W. Arnold, Criminal Attempts—
The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53 (1930); the other two articles were Thurman Arnold, The 
Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process, 45 HARV. L. REV. 617 (1932), and Thurman 
Arnold, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (1931). 
 24. Arnold, Law Enforcement, supra note 1, at 17. 
 25. See ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1930).  
 26. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935). 
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earlier. 
But his academic career was brief, lasting only a decade before he permanently 
abandoned New Haven for Washington, D.C.27 Appointed head of antitrust enforcement 
at the Department of Justice during the period before the nation’s entry into World War 
II,28 he reached nearly celebrity status as a trustbuster.29 He was pushed from that position 
to a judgeship on the D.C. Circuit, which he in turn resigned to become a founding partner 
of Arnold, Fortas & Porter (later, and still today, Arnold & Porter when Abe Fortas entered 
the judiciary).30 He spent the final decades of his career in private practice as a prominent 
D.C. lawyer with strong ties to the Democratic Party. 
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN ACTION 
In their Wickersham Commission study, Clark, Douglas, Arnold, and a battery of 
assistants investigated the work of the federal courts in Connecticut,31 while coordinating 
with academics in other law schools (including the one in West Virginia whose deanship 
Arnold had forsaken) who were conducting similar studies in other states.32 Arnold 
promoted his group’s work in a “progress report” published in a 1931 issue of the 
American Bar Association Journal that described the project in explicitly realist terms, 
emphasizing its study of the “law in action” through “that which happens in law suits” 
while rejecting the formalist study of the “formation of principles.”33 His group, Arnold 
claimed, did not simply aggregate cases within empty concepts, but instead obtained “mass 
statistics” of the actual procedures that courts used, and then “counted and tabulated” these 
statistics with the fabulously newfangled technology of the “Hollerith Punch Card 
Systems.”34 Real results and insights into the state of the law would surely follow, as 
would the opportunity for reform. 
The preliminary results of their study of criminal cases in Connecticut, Arnold 
reported, offered some “rather surprising” data that “raise[d] interesting queries for future 
examination.”35 The investigators, as well as those who sponsored the study, shared 
certain assumptions about how federal courts were performing in response to the deluge 
of prosecutions under the federal Volstead Act prohibiting the production, sale, and 
possession of alcohol. They all assumed that the courts were suffering from “the widely 
advertised results of what is generally called ‘the sporting theory of justice’”—foolishly 
complicated procedural considerations and delays, irrational juries, and cutthroat fights 
between prosecution and defense that called into question the justice and correctness of 
                                                          
 27. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 108. 
 28. WALLER, supra note 9, at 78–83. 
 29. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC 
AMBIVALENCE 431–55 (1966); WYATT WELLS, ANTITRUST AND THE FORMATION OF THE POSTWAR WORLD 43–
83 (2002). 
 30. WALLER, supra note 9, at 111–50. 
 31. SCHLEGEL, supra note 18, at 88. 
 32. ARNOLD, supra note 9, at 62–63; SCHLEGEL, supra note 18, at 86–88. 
 33. Thurman W. Arnold, Progress Report on Study of the Federal Courts—No. 7, 17 A.B.A. J. 799, 799–800 
(1931). 
 34. Id. at 799. 
 35. Id. at 800–01. 
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the result in individual cases.36 Instead, Arnold and his co-authors found that the federal 
criminal docket, at least in the District of Connecticut, constituted a system that seemed 
“almost too efficient”: courts resolved a large percentage of cases expeditiously, without 
technical arguments or delay, and held only nine criminal jury trials in a three-year 
period.37 They achieved this “efficiency” because the prosecution and defense frequently 
bargained to achieve a mutually acceptable plea agreement that the assigned judge would 
in turn accept. 
What the study had discovered—what Arnold found so “surprising” and 
“interesting”—was modern criminal procedure, in all its unromantic glory.38 This process 
might have seemed at odds with traditional conceptions of mechanical law enforcement, 
and it certainly suffered from being “executed sub rosa where the merits of the prosecutor’s 
action cannot be examined.”39 For Arnold, however, such bargaining was an essential 
element of the discretion vested in the prosecuting attorney. It constituted a necessary 
means to provide justice in individual cases and manage the prosecution of “unenforceable 
laws” that required prosecution of more defendants than the criminal justice system could 
effectively administer.40 The Connecticut federal courts study was one of a burgeoning 
group of empirical studies of local criminal courts being undertaken throughout the 
country,41 and the results Arnold and his collaborators found corresponded with those of 
other surveys, which also revealed the surprising extent of prosecutorial discretion and 
negotiated compromise between the state and defendants.42 Academics quickly began to 
comment on the relationship between substantive criminal law’s aims and criminal 
procedure’s administrative peculiarities. In the first edition of his landmark book Theft, 
Law and Society, Jerome Hall, a rising star in the study of criminal law and a student of 
the leading realist Karl Llewellyn, compared what the crime studies revealed about 
prosecutorial discretion with that of previous centuries and found that the legally 
sanctioned area of prosecutorial discretion had increased “considerably” in modern 
criminal law, particularly in its application by prosecutors to individual defendants.43 
Notwithstanding the apparent excitement of this discovery—and perhaps because of 
the boredom and hard work that comes from creating a large data set—the courts study 
                                                          
 36. Id. at 801. 
 37. Id. 
 38. SCHLEGEL, supra note 18, at 89. The renewed interest in plea bargaining over the past several decades 
demonstrates that the issue remains at the center of criminal procedure and academic literature. See Stephanos 
Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea 
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992). 
 39. Arnold, Progress Report, supra note 33, at 802. 
 40. Id. at 801–02. 
 41. ALLEN HENDERSHOTT EATON & SHELBY MILLARD HARRISON, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOCIAL SURVEYS 
79–81 (1930) (listing sixteen empirical studies of local, state, and federal criminal justice issues published 
between 1904 and 1927, with the majority published in the 1920s). The most prominent study was the Cleveland 
Crime Survey, which was overseen by Felix Frankfurter and Roscoe Pound and published as Criminal Justice in 
Cleveland. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922). 
 42. See Frank J. Remington, The Decision to Charge, the Decision to Convict on a Plea of Guilty, and the 
Impact of Sentence Structure on Prosecution Practices, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE TENSION 
BETWEEN INDIVIDUALIZATION AND UNIFORMITY 73, 80–81 (Lloyd E. Ohlin & Frank J. Remington eds., 1993). 
 43. JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW, AND SOCIETY 111–17 (1935). 
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would mark the end of Arnold the empiricist. But his writings would soon consider the 
implications of the modern criminal procedure he had discovered. Before then, however, 
he began his sole-authored academic work with a more traditional foray into realist 
doctrinal criticism. 
III. DOCTRINAL REALISM: THE CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS DOCTRINE 
Arnold’s first major law review article sought to radically reconsider the criminal 
attempts doctrine from a prototypically realist approach, one that trusted the intuitive 
ability of judges to identify criminally culpable attempts and that thoroughly distrusted 
efforts to formulate broadly applicable, formal definitions of a trans-substantive concept 
of attempt. At common law, a defendant’s attempt to commit a crime was an indictable 
offense.44 The requisite act for the crime of attempt was “more than mere preparation,” 
but less than “actual commission . . . except for failure to consummate all elements of the 
substantive crime.”45 Cases and commentaries had long lamented the doctrine’s complex, 
if not incoherent, distinction between those uncompleted criminal offenses that warrant 
punishment and those that do not.46 The inchoate nature of the offense and the difficulty 
of line-drawing across failed efforts to complete different substantive offenses—should 
the test for attempted murder, for example, be the same as that for attempted forgery?—
seemed to make the doctrine both impossible to figure in the abstract and, for that very 
reason, enormously attractive to scholars seeking to prove their analytical mettle. 
Several prominent early twentieth-century academics attempted to solve the riddle 
through careful parsing of the doctrine, offering various, and often contradictory, efforts 
to end the inconsistency found in caselaw. A generation earlier, Joseph Beale, the ardent 
Harvard formalist who would later become the realists’ bête noire, had asserted the 
doctrine’s coherence.47 Beale’s 1903 Harvard Law Review article conceded the 
dichotomous nature of attempt by noting that the doctrine simultaneously concerns “a mere 
shadow of the attempted offense, deriving its criminal nature entirely from the substantive 
offense to which it is subsidiary” and a distinct offense that has “the qualities and 
characteristics of other crimes.”48 Ignoring the complications that might arise from this 
insight, Beale confidently identified four elements of the attempt crime, emphasizing its 
distinctiveness and ignoring the specificity of the substantive crime attempted. Thus, an 
attempt was simply an act (“a step toward a punishable offense”), the intent to “adapt[]” 
that step toward a purpose to complete the offense, nearness of success, and failure.49 
Elements, clearly defined, could bring principled order to a difficult doctrine.50 
                                                          
 44. See State v. Addor, 110 S.E. 650 (N.C. 1922). 
 45. Id. at 650–51. 
 46. See, e.g., Hicks v. Commonwealth, 9 S.E. 1024, 1025 (Va. 1889) (complaining that attempt is “more 
intricate and difficult of comprehension than any branch of the criminal law”); 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, BISHOP 
ON CRIMINAL LAW ¶ 725, at 517 (John M. Zane & Carl Zollmann eds., 9th ed. 1923) (describing attempt as an 
“intricate and important” doctrine that is “imperfectly understood by the courts”). 
 47. For a summary of the realists’ war on Beale, see KALMAN, supra note 9, at 25–28. 
 48. J. H. Beale, Jr., Criminal Attempts, 16 HARV. L. REV. 491, 491–92 (1903). 
 49. Id. at 492. 
 50. The Bishop treatise agreed with Beale that the doctrine could be distilled to essential elements, although 
it restated only three—intent, performance, and failure—and suggested that all authorities seemed to be in general 
agreement “as to the essentials of the crime though they differ in their forms of expression.” 1 BISHOP ON 
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But even Beale’s assured analysis of attempt could not tame criminal attempt, and 
the terms of the debate he sought to end remained just as alive among the next generation 
of law professors. Arnold’s contemporaries tried novel analytical and historical 
approaches to sort and resolve criminal attempt’s riddle. For Francis Sayre of Harvard, a 
prominent criminal law professor and casebook author, attempt constituted a thoroughly 
modern doctrine, one first articulated in a brilliant 1784 decision by Lord Mansfield that 
generalized previous, scattered common law approaches to uncompleted offenses.51 Sayre 
consolidated Beale’s four elements into three: act, intent, and consequences, with intent 
playing the dominant role and the consequences of an attempt the least significant one 
(since by definition they could not include the consequences of a successful criminal 
offense).52 Sayre’s intent inquiry focused on whether the intended consequences 
constituted a crime, and, if the defendant’s failure to complete the crime was based on a 
mistake of fact, whether that mistake was one that a “reasonable man” in similar 
circumstances with criminal intent would make. If the intent requirement was met, the 
defendant would be liable for a criminal attempt so long as the act was sufficiently 
advanced.53 
Sayre’s confident parsing of the doctrine faced competition, however. In the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Professor John Strahorn peered into the doctrinal 
abyss and found that criminal attempt’s riddle could be solved by focusing not on act and 
intent but on the question of whether an attempt creates “a substantial impairment of some 
interest protected by the involved prohibitions against the crime or its related attempt.”54 
Strahorn focused on the prohibition’s purpose rather than the defendant’s intent after 
engaging in a complicated effort to divide the issue of impossibility—defendants whose 
failure to complete a criminal act was caused by its impossibility as a matter of fact or 
law—into multiple types of impossibility (“extrinsic,” “intrinsic,” and “legal” 
impossibility55) and multiple types of attempts (“relative” and “direct” attempts56). This 
effort at analytic distinction could offer greater clarity in explaining past cases and guiding 
future decisions—but it could not, alas, offer perfect predictability. John Curran, another 
of Sayre’s competitors, argued in a two-part series published in the Georgetown Law 
Journal that an attempt merited criminal punishment to the extent that it breached the 
peace and thereby challenged and harmed the state’s authority. Curran challenged Sayre 
on doctrinal history, claiming that attempt was not a modern invention but had always 
been consistently understood in Anglo-American law as distinct from a completed crime. 
                                                          
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 46, § 729, ¶ 1, at 519. 
 51. Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REV. 821, 834, 836–37 (1928) (citing Rex v. 
Scofield, Cald. 397 (1784)). 
 52. Id. at 838–39. 
 53. Id. at 839, 859. 
 54. John S. Strahorn, Jr., The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 971 (1930). 
 55. “Intrinsic impossibility” refers to the defendant’s ineffectual effort to engage in a substantive offense; 
“extrinsic impossibility” occurs when a normally effective attempt is frustrated by some occurrence outside of 
his control; and “legal impossibility” refers to instances when the attempted act is not prohibited by law. Id. at 
962–63. 
 56. “Relative attempts” are those that fail to complete a substantive criminal prohibition; “direct attempts” 
are acts that are themselves punishable by statute or, at the time of Strahorn’s article, common law crimes. Id. at 
963–64. 
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He also challenged Sayre’s conceptual understanding, arguing that the underlying criminal 
nature of the act was in the attempt’s threat to public order and the state rather than the 
defendant’s criminal intent.57 
To understand the varied approaches each of these confident scholars proposed, 
consider their disparate comments on People v. Lee Kong, a then-canonical case in which 
the California Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s conviction for assault with intent to 
kill.58 The defendant, keeper of a gambling hall, had learned that the police had put his 
premises under surveillance and that an officer had bored a hole in the roof to observe the 
illegal proceedings therein. Lee Kong shot a pistol at the peephole, mistakenly thinking 
the officer was in position at a moment when the officer was in fact perched elsewhere on 
the roof. The defendant was tried and convicted of assault with intent to murder on the 
ground that the officer would likely have been killed had he been at the location where the 
defendant had aimed and shot. The issue on appeal was whether the defendant had a 
“present ability to commit a violent injury upon the person of another,” as required by 
California’s statutory definition of assault, despite his mistake regarding the officer’s 
location.59 The California Supreme Court reasoned that because Lee Kong knew the 
officer was on the roof when he fired with the intent to kill him, he manifested both the 
intent and the ability sufficient to meet the statutory requirement for an unlawful attempt.60 
Most early twentieth-century commentators on criminal attempt agreed with the 
result, but for different reasons. Beale, the outlying über-formalist, supported the decision 
to the extent the facts showed the defendant intended to shoot his bullet “into contact” with 
the policeman and therefore attempted to kill the officer.61 If, on the other hand, he took 
the hole with the light shining through it for a human eye, and shot to put his bullet into 
the eye, since the supposed eye was only a lighted hole, the intended contact was not 
criminal and he was not guilty of a criminal attempt.62 This absurd distinction apparently 
needed no explanation for Beale, and so he failed to provide one. Sayre’s explanation, 
again focusing on the defendant’s intent and also a bit mystifying, was at least a little more 
comprehensible: insofar as Lee Kong had intended to shoot at the peephole, he appeared 
to have no intent to murder (since he mistakenly thought the police officer was in that 
position); but because he also intended to hit the body of the officer with his bullet, he 
clearly intended to murder and his mistake as to the officer’s location was a “reasonable” 
one warranting criminal punishment.63 Strahorn supported the decision because the 
intended victim’s fear of death or bodily harm “was a substantial impairment of [the 
officer’s] interest to be free from the fear of death”;64 Curran, too, viewed the decision 
through the prism of his own particular theory, finding that the defendant’s malicious act 
                                                          
 57. John Curran, Criminal and Non-Criminal Attempts, Part II, 19 GEO. L.J. 316, 337 (1931) [hereinafter 
Curran, Attempts Part II]; see also John Curran, Criminal and Non-Criminal Attempts, Part I, 19 GEO. L.J. 185 
(1930) (offering history of the early common law of attempt). 
 58. People v. Lee Kong, 30 P. 800 (1892). 
 59. Id. at 800–01. 
 60. Id. at 801. 
 61. Beale, supra note 48, at 495. 
 62. Id. No later commentators could understand the distinction Beale made. 
 63. Sayre, supra note 51, at 839, 852 & n.99. 
 64. Strahorn, supra note 54, at 982. 
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deserved punishment because it directly threatened “the order of things.”65 In Lee Kong, 
as in the doctrine of criminal attempt generally, commentators found evidence of the 
doctrine’s coherence by reference to their own efforts to form a conceptual frame that 
could explain it. Viewed together, however, their disparate explanations merely suggested 
collective confusion about a doctrine in search of a purpose and coherence. 
Arnold would have none of this. He offered a prototypically realist take on the 
criminal attempt doctrine, one so bold as to proclaim in the article’s title that what had 
come before him established little more than an empty, incoherent “abstraction.”66 Yes, 
the doctrine was confused, he proclaimed, but the confusion emanated not from judges’ 
inability to parse the doctrine’s elements correctly or to conceptualize the doctrine’s 
purpose correctly; rather, the doctrine was confused because it assumed that “attempt” 
existed in the abstract, apart from the underlying crime attempted, and could be identified 
as such. Put more simply, the law of criminal attempts did not suffer from poor reasoning; 
criminal law suffered because of the existence of the criminal attempts doctrine. Indeed, 
by establishing the doctrine and thereby initiating the modern law of criminal attempts, 
Lord Mansfield—Professor Sayre’s hero for having established attempt as a distinct, 
independent doctrine—precipitated precisely the formalist parade of “analytical thinking” 
and “search for abstractions” that would confuse scholars and jurists for a century and a 
half.67 
Arnold offered a number of reasons to abandon the criminal attempts doctrine as 
confused and confusing besides his distaste for formalist reasoning. Because some 
attempts to engage in criminal activity are not criminal acts—it would make no sense, for 
example, to prosecute someone for attempting to drive while intoxicated—the concept of 
attempt inevitably requires some context to define criminal culpability.68 It also makes no 
sense to prosecute someone for attempting to engage in a criminal attempt or an attempt 
to engage in a similarly inchoate offense like assault. Many crimes already seem like 
attempts, insofar as they seek to prohibit certain acts that are assumed to be precursors to 
other, more blameworthy acts—violation of the Mann Act, for example, or indecent 
solicitation, or shooting dangerous firearms, or assault with intent to kill.69 Indeed, the 
very idea of prosecuting an attempt to engage in inchoate-like criminal behavior suggests 
either of two absurd results: an infinite regress in which all incipient behavior becomes 
punishable—though at what point is the attempt to attempt to attempt too attenuated to 
prosecute?—or a doctrine that refuses to punish attempts at inchoate offenses and thus 
turns a blind eye to well-developed plans to engage in aggressively threatening behavior.70 
Most important of all, viewing attempt as a separate crime leads to the foolish effort 
to define the intent to attempt as a general matter. Does someone who makes a mistake of 
                                                          
 65. Curran, Attempts Part II, supra note 57, at 333–34. 
 66. Thurman W. Arnold, Criminal Attempts—The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53 (1930) 
[hereinafter Arnold, Criminal Attempts]. A year after its publication, the prominent realist Jerome Frank praised 
the article as “brilliant.” See Jerome Frank, Book Review, 40 YALE L.J. 1120, 1124 n.11 (1931). 
 67. Arnold, Criminal Attempts, supra note 66, at 59–60. 
 68. Id. at 63–64. 
 69. Id. at 64. 
 70. Arnold mocked one effort to sort different kinds of attempts to attempt. Id. at 65 (summarizing and 
critiquing Strahorn, supra note 54, at 963 (distinguishing between “direct” and “relative” attempts)). 
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fact—thinking the officer is perched at the peephole, for example—have the requisite 
“intent” to attempt to murder?71 Presumably so, unless the mistake was so absurd as to 
throw the idea of intent into doubt—in which case is intent truly the issue? Even more 
telling in this context was a hypothetical fact pattern over which Arnold’s contemporaries 
obsessed, in which a hypothetical shooter fires at a tree stump confusing the stump with a 
person he intends to kill. Arnold mocked the various commentators on this scenario who 
disagreed with each other over culpability—one criminal law treatise suggested that there 
is guilty intent but no overt act,72 Beale claimed the shooter lacks intent to murder because 
he was shooting at a stump rather than at a person,73 while Sayre would have considered 
whether the act was a “reasonable” mistake.74 Their efforts merely demonstrated for 
Arnold that attempt and the element of intent, viewed in the abstract, were beside the point. 
Arnold found a safe haven in the midst of all this foolishness—in the courts, where 
judges understood these issues better than formalist commentators. They correctly 
punished especially blameworthy attempts and related crimes (such as aggravated assault) 
without engaging in analytical somersaults to sort and create a pure, consistent, trans-
substantive doctrine of attempt.75 Courts resolved the issue before them in individual, 
concrete cases without recourse to highly abstract concepts of “criminal attempt” writ 
large. Doing so, the courts intuitively developed a distinct mode of analysis that promised 
a solution to the dilemma with which his contemporaries struggled. Following his reading 
of the case law and his suspicion of formalist concepts, Arnold proposed that attempts did 
not constitute a separate crime, but should be viewed within the ambit of the substantive 
offense the defendant allegedly failed to complete. Viewed this way, attempt to murder is 
merely a subsidiary of the statutory prohibition against murder, attempt to commit forgery 
should be evaluated under the forgery statute, and so on. Rather than create a separate 
crime, the prohibition against attempt should serve “as a power or discretion that has been 
given to the courts either by the legislature or by common law precedent to extend the 
limits of prohibitions against certain kinds of conduct which does not quite fall within the 
terms of those prohibitions.”76 The criminal attempt doctrine constituted for Arnold a gap-
filling device that allowed courts to punish criminally culpable conduct not included within 
a statute’s specific language and not serious enough to warrant the full penalty for violating 
said statute.77 It was akin to a lesser included offense in those instances when the 
defendant’s conduct approached but did not quite meet the elements required to prove 
violation of the prohibited criminal act. Better, Arnold reasoned, to view attempted murder 
in its relationship to murder than in its relationship to attempts at other crimes. 
The payoff of his approach, he claimed, would be a more pragmatic means of 
deciding disparate cases, one sensitive and deferential to the trial courts’ conclusions about 
                                                          
 71. Id. at 68–70. 
 72. Id. at 69 n.46 (citing 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 225 (11th ed. 1912)). 
 73. Beale, supra note 48, at 494. 
 74. Sayre, supra note 51, at 853. 
 75. Arnold, Criminal Attempts, supra note 66, at 64–65. Arnold also argued that all of the inchoate offenses, 
including attempt, assault, and solicitation, are sufficiently similar that classifying them as distinct makes little 
sense. Id. at 66–67. 
 76. Id. at 74. 
 77. Id. at 75–76. 
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the context in which the allegedly criminal act occurred. He rejected efforts to articulate 
clear doctrinal definitions and boundaries for criminal attempt and wished that scholars 
would abandon the effort to establish formal elements and abstract concepts. In the 
process, he also dispensed with the search for legal clarity and predictability in favor of 
granting triers of fact the authority to evaluate a given attempt in light of the underlying 
though uncompleted substantive offense and statute.78 For example, although Arnold did 
not directly address the Lee Kong decision described above, his approach would support 
the court’s conclusion for reasons other than its consistency with the idiosyncratic, 
complex readings of the doctrine his contemporaries offered. Instead, the trial record 
demonstrated that the defendant fired a deadly weapon at where he thought a policeman 
was located. The trial court had decided that this act was sufficiently dangerous that it fell 
within the policy of the substantive crime—prohibiting the intentional, unprovoked 
exercise of deadly force.79 In his brief application of his approach to other fact patterns, 
Arnold showed a concern above all with factual context: the danger of the defendant’s 
conduct and intent, as well as the defendant’s personal character as found by the trier of 
facts.80 The legal focus should either be on the crime itself—comparing and evaluating an 
incomplete attempt with a completed offense—or on other attempts to accomplish the 
same crime, when comparing the facts and the dangerousness of the defendants would 
actually have relevance. Far-flung analogies may give the appearance of logic and 
analytical rigor and predictability, but as Arnold’s realist critique demonstrated, they failed 
either to find consistency in the law or to articulate principles that could create it from 
abstraction. 
This was not an entirely new idea, nor has it proved unique to Arnold. A generation 
earlier, Oliver Wendell Holmes had suggested that in deciding culpability for attempt, 
“[e]very question of proximity must be determined by its own circumstances, and analogy 
is too imperfect to give much help”; for this reason, he refused to analogize a failed effort 
to poison another to attempts to achieve “lighter crimes.”81 Writing a decade after 
                                                          
 78. Id. at 76–77, 80. 
 79. Compare id. at 76 (outlining Arnold’s “policy” for deciding criminal attempts), with People v. Lee Kong, 
30 P. 800, 800–01 (1892) (“He shot in no fright, and his aim was good, for the bullet passed through the roof at 
the point intended; but, very fortunately for the officer of the law, at the moment of attack he was upon the roof 
viewing the scene of action at an opening some distance from his contemplated point of observation, and thus no 
substantial results followed from appellant’s fire. . . . That the shot did not fulfill the mission intended was not 
attributable to forbearance or kindness of heart upon defendant’s part.”). 
 80. A defendant who attempted forgery, for example, should not be prosecuted so long as no harm was caused 
“and we do not have the same desire to extend [a forgery law’s] limits as we do in the case of murder”; a child 
accused of attempted rape when he was below the minimum age required for criminal liability should be punished 
based on his physical and emotional maturity, not on arbitrary age distinctions established in the abstract; 
attempts at incestuous marriage that are foiled before completion should be exonerated where a court concludes 
“that nothing short of the completed crime should be punished.” Arnold, Criminal Attempts, supra note 66, at 
77. 
 81. Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 48 N.E. 770, 771 (Mass. 1897). In The Common Law, Holmes wrote: 
Eminent judges have been puzzled where to draw the line [of culpability], or even to state the principle 
on which it should be drawn . . . . But the principle is believed to be similar to that on which all other 
lines are drawn by the law. Public policy, that is to say, legislative considerations, are at the bottom 
of the matter; the considerations being, in this case, the nearness of the danger, the greatness of the 
harm, and the degree of apprehension felt. 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 68 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1967) (1881). 
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Arnold’s article, Jerome Hall also suggested that the attempt doctrine was sufficiently fact-
specific and indeterminate as to require significant delegation to triers of fact in every case, 
albeit with “the best possible methods for guidance of judgment” from substantive law and 
an active appellate review for “irrational verdicts.”82 Like Arnold, Hall called for shifting 
the focus in criminal attempts doctrine away from the “logical manipulation of 
propositions to try the consistency of theories” and toward concern with “the functioning 
of the system” of criminal justice.83 But Arnold appeared not to trust the doctrinal 
limitations that appellate courts would develop or, worse, adopt from academics or 
treatises; for him, deference to the trial courts’ response to a fact pattern and to a particular 
defendant was sufficient. His approach seemed both superficially attractive in its criticism 
of its rivals and subject to widely different, unpredictable results across cases. It was not a 
doctrine so much as a grant of authority. It rightly recognized and critiqued the excesses 
of doctrinal form but offered nothing in its place but potentially random, individualized 
judgments. 
As critique, Arnold’s realist intervention correctly identified the slippery 
incoherence of formalist efforts to domesticate the unruly concept of criminal attempts. 
He could not, however, shame or shut down these efforts; nor did he propose an alternative 
scheme that would shift attention from a trans-substantive concept of attempt to what he 
saw as a more grounded and fact-specific approach that would compare an alleged attempt 
to the specific crime attempted. The doctrine today remains as muddled and contentious 
as it was in Arnold’s era;84 yet it continues to attract commentators who obsessively offer 
their own solutions as if only they and their pet theory can finally solve the doctrinal 
riddle.85 In so doing, Arnold illustrated the core problem realists faced: They could see 
through formalism’s empty concepts and incoherence and they could demonstrate the 
failure of those concepts to explain what courts did and what they should do; but realists 
often failed to displace formalist concepts with significantly more functional approaches, 
nor could they displace the desire among academics and the legal profession for the 
concepts that formalists produce, and the “dream of predictability” that formalists claimed 
to offer.86 This failing would become the central question for Arnold’s next article on 
                                                          
 82. Jerome Hall, Criminal Attempt—A Study of Foundations of Criminal Liability, 49 YALE L.J. 789, 827–
28 (1940). Notably, Hall did not cite Arnold’s article, although he did cite Holmes. See id. at 822–23. 
 83. Id. at 831. 
 84. Mark Kelman famously “trashed,” in critical legal studies terms, criminal law doctrine in large part via 
the attempt doctrine—a trashing that Leo Katz recently updated in terms of contemporary strains and tastes of 
legal theory. See Leo Katz, Nine Takes on Indeterminacy, with Special Emphasis on the Criminal Law, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1945 (2015); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. 
L. REV. 591, 620–27, 652–56 (1981). According to one of its proponents, the Model Penal Code does no better. 
See William T. Pizzi, Rethinking Attempt Under the Model Penal Code, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 771 (2012). 
 85. Rather than offer an extremely long footnote with citations to a dozen or more law review articles to 
illustrate this point, consider a very recent, high-profile effort which claimed, more than eighty years after 
Arnold’s critique (and thirty years after Kelman’s, supra note 84), that “courts and commentators have 
consistently failed to explicitly offer a coherent theory of this fundamental area of criminal law,” before 
confidently pronouncing: “Despair no longer. This Article offers a framework for thinking about attempts that 
solves important problems of adjudication—problems to which we currently lack principled solutions despite the 
great frequency with which defendants charged with criminal attempts appear in courtrooms.” Gideon Yaffe, 
Criminal Attempts, 124 YALE L.J. 92, 95 (2014). I am quite confident that the riddle will remain unsolved eighty 
years hence. 
 86. See Arnold, Criminal Attempts, supra note 66, at 80. 
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criminal law, which foreshadowed the basic insight of his post-realist theory of law. 
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AS ADMINISTRATION: LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Immediately following Criminal Attempts, Arnold published a similarly realist 
doctrinal article in 1931 in the Columbia Law Review that critiqued the new Restatement 
of the Law of Trusts.87 Again, he mocked formalist, elitist, and academic efforts to tame 
an unruly doctrine, and again he advocated the pragmatic, functionalist approach taken by 
courts that focused on the facts in individual cases and privileged the ends sought by those 
who created trusts over the formal requirements for trust creation that a conceptualist 
approach would require. Two years later, Arnold returned to the topic of criminal law 
administration in an article that sought to investigate—or, as he described his method, 
“dissect”—the term “law enforcement” and to consider why scholars are unable to 
persuade courts and legislatures to adopt their great ideas.88 What are the “stimuli” to 
which courts respond, Arnold asked, and why do the “low-minded schemes” of pedestrian 
reformers and politicians succeed when the “high-minded” ones, put forth by those with 
the best of intentions and intellectual pedigrees, fail? This question departed from those he 
asked in his previous two articles, which focused instead on criticizing those bad, high-
minded ideas that failed to persuade judges who rightly preferred their own intuitions 
about the facts of cases to the abstractions proposed by academics. Here, the question was 
not what or how but why—why do courts act the way they do, what forces affect their 
operation and decision-making, and what can reformers do to improve the performance of 
courts and legislatures? 
At least on the surface, then, Arnold’s dissection method sought more than simply 
description and reformist prescription. “Law enforcement,” as a concept or ideal, “has . . . 
its value in inducing a feeling that criminal justice is both impartial and impersonal,”89 
and his dissection would in turn serve as a means to investigate the larger issue of law’s 
resistance to reform. He took a systematic view of the entire criminal justice system and 
reviewed all of the relevant institutions: prosecuting and defense attorneys, the courts, the 
legislatures that create the substantive criminal laws, and the public whose moral 
commitments and prerogatives presumably constitute the basis for criminal law and whose 
support gives legitimacy to the state. 
His analysis began with the ideal of the “law” to be enforced. Scholars during his 
time (as well as our own90) decried the expansion of criminal laws—although especially 
relevant in 1932 was the federal prohibition on the manufacture, sale, and consumption of 
alcohol, which not only expanded the number of laws but also their violation by a broad 
swathe of the public. Arnold characterized criminal law doctrine as an “elaborate . . . 
attempt to reconcile and make more definite the implications of the vague public ideals 
                                                          
 87. Thurman Arnold, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (1931). 
 88. Arnold, Law Enforcement, supra note 1. 
 89. Id. at 6. 
 90. See generally Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1191, 1197–
1213 (2015) (summarizing the literature on overcriminalization); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of 
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 512–19 (2001) (describing criminal law’s excessive “breadth and depth”). 
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that surround the criminal courts.”91 Because the body of criminal sanctions needing 
enforcement bore the weight of the nation’s cultural and social values, the law’s incessant 
expansion merely reflected the multiple and contradictory concerns it was required to 
address. When any existing law appeared to be widely violated and underenforced, he 
observed, legislatures passed new laws to address whatever issue the initial laws had not 
yet resolved.92 At the same time, some existing criminal laws were underenforced and 
some minor violations by “respectable” individuals were under-prosecuted because neither 
the offenses nor offenders appear to be “criminal.”93 The law part of “law enforcement,” 
then, may represent a perfect ideal of a morally-based, coherent criminal code, but in 
reality it fails to constitute a mechanical, essential body of rules. Instead, it ceaselessly 
spreads in response to the latest panic while society projects its incoherent and 
contradictory moral principles upon it. 
The enforcement part of the phrase, also “a reverently held ideal,” presumes that 
prosecutors and judges mechanically, impartially, and impersonally apply all laws equally, 
no matter the relative merit of any one law.94 During debates over Prohibition, for 
example, both the “drys” who led the charge for temperance laws and the “wets” who 
opposed them claimed a commitment to the ideal of law enforcement: for the drys, the 
Volstead Act could and should have been enforced universally and mechanically, while 
one of the wets’ most vociferous complaints was that the inevitable inability of prosecutors 
and courts to strictly enforce the prohibition laws would perforce degrade the principle of 
law enforcement.95 No one sought strict enforcement of civil laws—such as tortuous 
negligence, breach of contract, regulatory ratemaking, and unfair competition—whose 
legitimacy survived their imperfect enforcement by courts. But the simpler, more widely 
applicable, morally-derived criminal prohibitions, whose violation was more likely to 
receive public attention through newspaper and radio, appeared to require perfect 
enforcement.96 The ideal view of “law enforcement” presumes an essential relationship 
between moral codes and the state: substantive laws establish norms of behavior, and it is 
the role of government to strictly police and punish those who violate these norms. For 
Arnold, it serves as “the dramatization of the moral notions of the community.”97 
The ideal runs aground, however, on the realist shores of administration. Rather than 
viewing their jobs as the lead actors in a moral drama, Arnold argued, prosecutors in fact 
attempt to achieve the functionalist end of a criminal justice system—an orderly 
community.98 To do so, they administer laws in rational but imperfect ways outside of the 
public’s view, using their discretion to wield substantive criminal laws as “an arsenal of 
weapons with which to incarcerate certain dangerous individuals who are bothering 
society.”99 They could not, and did not, prosecute everyone who violated a crime, because 
                                                          
 91. Arnold, Law Enforcement, supra note 1, at 7. 
 92. Id. at 14. 
 93. Id. at 15. 
 94. Id. at 6, 11. 
 95. Id. at 11–12. 
 96. Arnold, Law Enforcement, supra note 1, at 96. 
 97. Id. at 8. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 9. 
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doing so would merely “clog the machinery” of justice “with relentless prosecution of 
comparatively harmless persons.”100 Law enforcement largely occurs in the decisions 
made by prosecutors to pursue certain alleged criminals, to strike bargains with some to 
gain guilty pleas, and to go to trial against some small number of others—all in order to 
best allocate limited resources while protecting the public from the worst and most 
dangerous criminals.101 Meanwhile, courts play only a minor role in the maintenance of 
public order, and the criminal trial, as Arnold’s later work would argue (and as the next 
section explains), is an almost entirely symbolic exercise that does little more than 
dramatize the ideals of law enforcement. 
Arnold drew two conclusions from this wide gulf between the public ideal of strict, 
moral law enforcement and the “law in action” of administrative practice. The first 
concerned the consequences of this gulf for criminal law and procedure. The distance 
between ideal and practice inevitably creates incoherent and largely meaningless doctrine, 
rather than the pure logical concepts that formalist academics would prefer, as the laws to 
be enforced cannot contain the ideals they are putatively intended to observe. In addition, 
the gap between the ideal of law enforcement and its actual practice led all of the knowing 
players in the system to protect the actual workings of the criminal justice system from 
public knowledge. The bargaining process that settles a majority of criminal prosecutions 
is driven underground because it emits “a bad odor,” while the ideal of criminally 
punishing all who violate the criminal law hampers the use of civil reparations to resolve 
disputes between defendants and victims.102 
Second, Arnold argued that the public ideal constitutes the conditions under which 
any effort to reform the criminal justice system must operate. The would-be reformer, 
Arnold argued, “should base his entire scheme of reform on a technique of public 
acceptance, which neither criticizes nor attempts to change general preconceptions, but 
rather uses them to accomplish the desired ends.”103 Formalist ideals about law 
enforcement cannot be merely swept away in the tide of reform; rather, realist, progressive 
interventions must work within or even manipulate those ideals to achieve piecemeal 
change. For example, psychology and psychiatry seemed to be chipping away slowly at 
the assumption of individual criminal responsibility, while one of the unintended 
consequences of Prohibition seemed to be an expansion of individual constitutional rights, 
like the Fourth Amendment right against illegal search and seizure, as broader and stricter 
enforcement of the laws against otherwise upright citizens created a popular backlash.104 
Incremental change from outside the law (imported, for example, from emerging fields of 
the social or medical sciences), or publicly supported changes from within the law, could 
accomplish reform. Thoroughgoing changes were unlikely to succeed, however, if they 
challenged, and could be seen as challenging, an ideal like law enforcement. 
                                                          
 100. Id. 
 101. See Arnold, Law Enforcement, supra note 1, at 17–18. 
 102. Id. at 19. 
 103. Id. at 13. 
 104. See id. at 20–22. 
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V. THE DRAMA OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 
If Arnold viewed the ideal of “law enforcement” as masking prosecutorial discretion 
with the false and impossible cover of mechanical perfection, he viewed the ideal drama 
of the criminal trial as masking the irrationalities and injustices of substantive law with the 
gloss of procedural fairness. In a characteristic argument that he made first in The Symbols 
of Government105 and then repeated only a few years before his death,106 Arnold claimed 
that the criminal trial is an essential practice in all stable societies, from the primitive and 
the medieval to the modern and from China to England, and that it is one of the 
fundamental operations that make the judicial system “[t]he center of ideals of every 
Western government.”107 The criminal trial’s symbolic preeminence—observable during 
Arnold’s time in newspapers, film, drama, and popular novels, and today in those media 
and even more in television—derives as much from its ceremonial procedures as from its 
instrumental objectives and results. Indeed, for both the general public and elites, the fair 
and neutral processes of a criminal trial are at least as important as a resulting verdict. A 
properly conducted, formally fair trial that results in a guilty verdict for an innocent 
defendant is a less troubling consequence of a functional criminal justice system than a 
departure from the conventional ceremonies of the trial that nevertheless results in an 
objectively correct verdict.108 For the legitimacy of both the criminal justice system and 
the society whose values that system is supposed to uphold, doing it right is more important 
than getting it wrong. Public, dramatic, understandable procedure trumps substantive 
injustice. 
To illustrate this dynamic, Arnold recounted the heresy trial of Joan of Arc, the 
transcript of which had recently appeared in an English translation.109 With his typically 
outrageous irony, Arnold announced his great respect for a clearly “political” trial in which 
the accused was presumed to be guilty of a substantive crime by her judges, the faculty of 
the University of Paris sitting as a secular appellate body in the Castle of Rouen.110 Surely, 
his contemporaneous reader must have thought, such a trial represents the relative 
savagery and ignorance of pre-modern conceptions of justice—after all, the defendant was 
executed by fire for the crime of heresy by a state controlled by occupying English 
conquerors. But Arnold claimed that the medieval show trial resembled a contemporary, 
well-run political trial.111 Despite the political pressures placed upon it, the court 
developed “a record of dignity and impartiality” and provided many of the requirements 
of modern due process.112 It even demonstrated its formal independence from the popular 
                                                          
 105. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935). 
 106. Indeed, his writings on the criminal trial were both so characteristic of his thought that he restated them 
a few years before his death, more than three decades after publication of The Symbols of Government. See 
Thurman Arnold, The Criminal Trial as a Symbol of Public Morality, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 139 
(Yale Kamisar et al. eds., 1965). 
 107. ARNOLD, supra note 105, at 128, 131–33. 
 108. Id. at 142–43. 
 109. See THE TRIAL OF JEANNE D’ARC, at ix (G.G. Coulton & Eileen Power eds., W. P. Barrett trans., 1932). 
 110. ARNOLD, supra note 105, at viii–ix. 
 111. For a contemporary account of the trial that is consistent with Arnold’s, if less hyperbolic, see DANIEL 
HOBBINS, THE TRIAL OF JOAN OF ARC 10–32 (2005). 
 112. ARNOLD, supra note 105, at 135–37. The due process rights afforded included medieval analogs to the 
preliminary hearing, the indictment, the presentation of evidence and the right to be heard, appellate review of a 
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and political controversy surrounding the accused; for example, it ruled out the torture of 
Joan as unnecessary, despite the fact that the judges were no doubt accustomed to such 
methods of salvation.113 The court could do nothing but “represent the prevailing ideals 
and phobias of its era,” like those modern courts that outlaw obscene materials or punish 
vocal political dissent, and apply the prevailing doctrines of heresy, belief, and 
ecclesiastical hierarchy with sufficient gravity, humility, and neutrality such that it could 
protect its own prestige.114 
In short, the medieval court served its role as a mechanical “judicial machine” that 
did not, and indeed could not, “question the underlying assumptions of the government 
which it supports, however regrettable those assumptions may be.”115 It was savage and 
mechanical; a perpetrator of ideological injustice and a symbol of great fairness. The latter 
terms in those ironic dualities made the court an apparently neutral, symbolically 
significant, and acceptable institution of justice, even as it applied primitive, superstitious 
beliefs and exacted a brutal judgment. 
The modern criminal trial is little different, Arnold argued, as it offers the drama of 
procedural criminal justice, and as such constitutes a “great humanitarian ideal,”116 even 
as it frequently subverts the pursuit of substantive justice. Consider first the role of zealous 
criminal defense attorneys. By their alleged actions, guilty criminal defendants have 
imperiled the forces of law and threaten future harm should they be released. And yet, their 
attorneys threaten to disrupt the moral order by providing them with a vigorous defense. 
If these attorneys fail to exploit any technical or procedural opening in the trial 
proceedings, however, they threaten to disrupt a system of advocacy that positions them 
as agents of their clients.117 Defense tactics, in turn, lengthen the time and costs of criminal 
trials and may subvert the cause of justice—as in the archetypal, if fairly rare, instance in 
which the defendant is acquitted or a trial dismissed due to a technical rule of evidence or 
trial procedure. Vigorous criminal defense may be essential to the drama of the criminal 
trial and to the ideal that defendants should receive a fair hearing in which they are 
represented fully and fairly, but the use of aggressive trial tactics appears to conflict with 
the attorneys’ role as officers of the court and frequently prove costly to the administration 
of criminal justice. 
These costs might be worth bearing if balanced by a rational, trustworthy 
adjudicatory system—that is, if we could have confidence that zealous advocacy on both 
sides led to more reliable verdicts, then perhaps the excesses of the advocacy could be 
more easily endured. Alas, Arnold argued, such is not the case. The jury is not a 
deliberative decision-making institution—it is “an unpredictable body,” Arnold wrote, 
“moved by emotional considerations, and not careful of the fundamental principles of the 
law because of ignorance, prejudice, etc.”118 It offers neither justice nor administrative 
efficiency. And yet, like the zealous advocates whose one-sided spiels it is supposed to 
                                                          
conviction, and a permanent written record. Id. at 136–37. 
 113. Id. at 138. 
 114. Id. at 136–37. 
 115. Id. at 140. 
 116. Id. at 143. 
 117. ARNOLD, supra note 105, at 142–44. 
 118. Id. at 144. 
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consider critically and weigh, the jury is also “the great symbol of justice,” ideally serving 
the role of a deliberative assemblage of peers able to pass judgment on the defendant and 
thereby give dignity to the proceedings and uphold the rights of the accused.119 As a 
representative, democratic sample of the citizenry apart from the state, the jury serves as 
the “shock absorber” for systemic criticisms of the criminal justice system. It can withstand 
the inevitable criticism arising from unsatisfactory results in individual cases and 
inconsistent results across cases.120 The symbolic value of the citizen jury, and the 
procedural legitimacy it brings to the criminal trial, transcends the potentially inferior 
substantive results the jury will render in its verdict. 
Meanwhile, the judge directs the various players in the drama through their 
necessary roles. As in Joan of Arc’s trial, a judge does not “question the underlying 
assumptions of the government which it supports, however regrettable those assumptions 
may be.”121 His responsibility is entirely procedural, only that “of an umpire”;122 when 
successful, the criminal trial judge allows all the circumstances to be considered by the 
jury and produces a record by which the “future” can judge “all the relevant facts.”123 The 
ideals of the criminal trial drama, then, embody the state’s effort to legitimate itself and its 
criminal justice system: the adversaries zealously advocate; the jury deliberates; the court 
referees and enforces. At the same time, the criminal trial emerges in Arnold’s description 
as an ideological mask over a system that malfunctions, with lying, conniving advocates 
seeking to free guilty defendants or punish innocent ones; manipulable, inattentive juries; 
and judges acting as little more than bureaucrats whose authority is limited to the stage 
directions of trial procedure. 
At first glance, Arnold’s description appears to be a familiar ideological critique of 
the state and its criminal justice system, anticipating the New Left and critical theoretical 
jeremiads against a criminal process and state that seem more concerned with their own 
legitimacy than with substantive injustice.124 Curiously, however, Arnold’s efforts to 
demystify the criminal trial’s socially symbolic functions were not especially critical—his 
voice certainly lacks the timbre of rage with which such demystification is usually made. 
Instead, Arnold frequently analogized his work on the criminal trial and on other areas of 
law to that of an anthropologist seeking not to condemn or celebrate his subjects but to 
capture through thick description their peculiar folkways. He was a detached social 
scientist, not a hand-wringing prophet. He simply described the ways that the American 
criminal justice system privileges procedure over substance—suggesting, perhaps, that he 
was a closet conservative, as one critic has argued.125 
But rather than either a nascent radical or conservative, Arnold was a Progressive 
                                                          
 119. Id. at 144–45. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 140. 
 122. ARNOLD, supra note 105, at 145. 
 123. Id. at 140. 
 124. The best examples of such scholarship are the essays on crime and justice in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A 
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998). See David Cole, Two Systems of Criminal Justice, in 
THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra, at 410; Elliott Currie, Crime and Punishment in the United States: Myths, Realities, 
and Possibilities, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra, at 381; David Rudovsky, Police Practices, in THE POLITICS 
OF LAW, supra, at 434. 
 125. See Ayer, supra note 9, at 1067–68. 
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Era intellectual who trusted the state apparatus as the preeminent means to develop and 
impose rational means to solve social and economic problems. He was also a legal 
academic of his time who believed in procedure as a means to protect fairness, impose 
social order, and promote and take advantage of institutional competence. But he was, at 
least as much, an ironist in the tradition of his contemporaries H. L. Mencken and 
Thorstein Veblen who perversely noted, and even celebrated, how procedure’s privileged 
position could lead to horrific substantive results.126 He either embraced or found tolerable 
the structural flaws in the criminal justice system, and he seemed to view its imperfections 
not as targets of reform but as essential components—perhaps unexpected consequences, 
but necessary ones—of a system devised, populated, and acceded to by humans of 
inherently limited capacity. He appears neither as a conservative seeking to uphold 
existing traditions and institutions nor a radical who rejects them. Arnold leaves us with a 
burning, frustrating question: Was he making a normative claim in favor of popular 
sentiment and against justice and administrative efficiency, or were his sarcasm and irony 
components of a campaign to unmask and critique the paradoxes and contradictions of the 
criminal trial? 
VI. POST-REALISM AND CRIMINAL LAW 
Part of this confusion comes from Arnold’s complicated relationship with legal 
realism and from tensions within realism itself. As a means to enforce the law, the criminal 
justice system appeared to Arnold the realist as significantly less than perfect. He identified 
the criminal trial’s weaknesses, comparing it unfavorably to the dispute resolution 
available through arbitration and the enforcement of federal laws and regulations by 
administrative agencies,127 while he berated both the sporting nature of trial techniques 
wielded by attorneys and the inability of criminal penalties and the penal system either to 
reform the guilty or make society safe.128 His critique of doctrine—from the narrow 
problem of criminal attempt to the broader ideal of the law to be enforced—and his 
characterization of the criminal justice process—from the broad delegation of 
prosecutorial enforcement to the criminal trial’s drama—at once embraced the law in 
action and noted its shortcomings. Like a good realist and a good Progressive, he could 
have suggested a resolution for the problems he identified, some clever prescriptive fix: 
trust the trial judge’s intuition (for which he advocated in his doctrinal article), or trust the 
law in action rather than the law on the books (as he seemed to suggest in his article on 
law enforcement), for example. And of course he did. But realism’s narrative resolution 
of the crises or flaws that its proponents identified—study it and fix it!—did not altogether 
satisfy Arnold. 
Instead, he mocked and snickered and sometimes enjoyed a good belly laugh. 
Because how can you reform the institutions and doctrines of the delusional?129 In fact, 
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the criminal trial had endured from Joan of Arc’s day to Arnold’s, and even to our own—
and not merely as a means to make determinations of guilt and innocence. It survives, 
Arnold proposed, because the administration of criminal justice is not a method of 
controlling crime but a popular drama of public morality, one meant to provide “a series 
of parables which are a guide to the honest and a terror to the outlaw.”130 The criminal 
trial symbolizes the morality and rationality of governance, offering “the heaven of justice 
which lies behind the insecurity, cruelty, and irrationality of an everyday world.”131 It may 
not provide an efficient and satisfactory resolution of the conflicts and contradictions 
between the individual and the state—indeed, perhaps it cannot do so, even if reformed 
and improved—but it validates both the state’s preeminence and the dignity of the 
individual within the dramatic spectacle that pits one against the other in a formally equal 
setting. The criminal trial is not a pragmatic tool subject to incremental improvement 
through the rational, practical intervention of smarty-pants academics and reformers. It is 
an ideological symbol of a rational judicial system within a stable government and society, 
legitimating both the substantive laws it is used to enforce and the state itself. Its symbolic 
authority overshadows the formal, procedural inadequacies that Arnold and his colleagues 
and contemporaries who studied the criminal courts found. The criminal trial’s role as 
drama, in sum, is neither a reflection of the criminal justice system’s perfection nor an 
empty, manipulative tool by which the state controls its subjects. Rather, it is an essential 
institution by which the state enforces the law, protects the individual through seemingly 
fair and neutral procedures, and, of equal importance, portrays its law enforcement and 
fairness to its spectating public. 
That said, Arnold offered the possibility for positive change in the criminal justice 
system in the institution of the prosecutor. Prosecutors decide how to best protect the 
public while efficiently managing scarce government resources. They need sufficient 
authority and deference to achieve these goals. The same commitment to expertise and the 
state was implicit in his prescription for the criminal attempts doctrine. To evaluate a 
defendant’s culpability for attempt, Arnold would defer to the trier of fact, who could 
develop and best evaluate the facts of a particular case—and while this figure might 
typically be a jury, Arnold seemed to suggest that his respect was for judges, presumably 
appellate judges, who were responding to their close review of a trial record. The ideal 
formal concept underlying an abstract doctrine is foolish, meaningless; the knowledgeable 
expert, closely evaluating the facts on the ground, is far better able to resolve the dispute 
effectively and correctly. 
Arnold observed that the social ideals of law enforcement were empty but pragmatic. 
Functionalist expertise, he felt, could nevertheless govern effectively through his own 
ideal: a state which operated consistently with legal realist and Progressive Era values 
while it appeared in the symbolic guise of a mechanical, formalistic machine. The ideal of 
“law enforcement” suggests to the public that the state’s authority to choose how and when 
to enforce the laws, and the flexibility with which it does so, does not exist. Under the 
ideal, all laws are enforced, fully and equally. The ideal legal form, sought so strenuously 
by Arnold’s formalist contemporaries in the criminal attempts doctrine, needs conceptual 
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clarity and consistency. Arnold’s “attempt at social dissection” of the law enforcement 
ideal thus proceeded as follows: He mocked general, formalistic principles, whether they 
were held by rival academics or the general public or, more likely, both; he noted the 
symbolic nature of these principles; he offered observations of how the law “really works” 
in practice in opposition to the misunderstandings that formalistic principles produce; but 
he asserted that efforts to reform the law to better reflect and accommodate the law in 
action are unlikely to succeed unless they respond to and accommodate the outdated, 
formalistic principles that he had earlier mocked. The fact that individual prosecutors 
might abuse their discretion and that the entire criminal justice system could become 
fundamentally unfair given the unfair distribution of resources between the state and 
criminal defendants132 was not part of Arnold’s theory or calculation. 
A decade after he left Yale, Arnold had the opportunity to apply his theory of 
criminal law on the bench to an issue that his academic work had briefly considered: the 
relationship between criminal insanity and the element of mens rea, or the mental state 
required for criminal culpability. In the intervening years, as Judge Arnold recognized in 
one of his earlier D.C. Circuit decisions, a coordinated movement had developed that 
sought “to give courts the assistance of unbiased [psychiatric] experts who are not selected 
by parties to the proceeding” for purposes of judicial review of administrative bodies 
making decisions regarding the criminally insane.133 Arnold’s realist embrace of the social 
sciences and of expert administrative processes, as well as his friendship with Yale 
psychologist Edward Robinson, suggested that he would embrace this effort to bring 
psychological insights to the treatment of the mentally ill and, by extension, to the 
evaluation of criminal defendants. 
The D.C. Circuit’s then-prevailing standard for whether a defendant could be 
excused from criminal liability due to insanity had been established by the British House 
of Lords in the mid-nineteenth century M’Naghten decision.134 The so-called M’Naghten 
rule limited consideration to the defendant’s ability to distinguish between right and 
wrong—those who could do so faced responsibility for their willful acts.135 The rule did 
not, of course, incorporate a complex, modern understanding of sanity that psychology 
and psychoanalysis would later provide; instead, it offered a fairly crude, moralistic 
conception of insanity based on what it assumed was an easily identifiable, essential 
baseline of moral behavior and cognition, as applied by a trier of fact based on a cursory 
examination of a defendant’s understanding of contemporary norms. 
But law’s modernity could not simply replace moral conceptions of criminal 
responsibility with the breakthroughs of social and behavioral sciences. In order to remain 
legitimate, Arnold argued, the law was required to act as if it represented a separate, better 
realm of folklore and symbols than whatever currently prevailing scientific method and 
findings that experts espouse. In his 1932 “Law Enforcement” article, he wrote, 
The search for definitions of mens rea since the McNaughton case [sic], while it 
may express public morality, is pathetic in its failure to solve the trial problem of 
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keeping emotion out while letting science in. And now comes the latest and most 
entertaining development of all, the parade of psychiatrists and alienists before the 
bewildered jury. Since they are “scientists” every believing person expects them to 
agree, if not now, at least some time in the future when the court or some impartial 
body selects them. No practical person expects anything of the kind. In practically 
all cases where the issue is contested they serve only one function, which is to 
permit evidence of mitigating circumstances to be brought before the jury.136 
Here again is the classic Arnold reversal, the strange mix of a conservative’s willingness 
to accept traditional morality with the realist’s search for a functional explanation and the 
cruel ironist’s sarcastic insinuation that the traditional view may be wrong. 
While on the bench, Arnold authored two significant decisions that considered the 
intersection of law and the modern sciences of the mind, Holloway v. United States137 and 
Fisher v. United States.138 Arnold’s opinion in Holloway held that the issue of whether a 
criminal defendant is mentally impaired and therefore not responsible for his actions is a 
jury question, and the testimony of licensed psychiatrists regarding a defendant’s mental 
state “cannot bind the jury except within broad limits.”139 Psychiatry applies diagnostic 
and therapeutic science, while the criminal law requires the jury apply the moral judgment 
of the community; the two are incompatible, Arnold concluded, and in the context of the 
criminal trial, science is merely evidence for the jury to consider rather than an authority 
to which the courts must defer—even when all three of the psychiatrists who testified at 
trial agreed that the defendant was psychopathic, and two testified that he was unable to 
tell right from wrong at the time of the offense.140 Arnold’s opinion in Fisher affirmed the 
district court’s refusal to give an instruction, proffered by the defense, that would have 
required the jury to consider the defendant’s “mental, nervous, [and] emotional . . . 
characteristics” in determining whether he murdered with premeditation.141 
At issue in both cases was the relationship between the claims of science and the 
commitments of the legal system. In his decisions, Arnold reasoned that because the legal 
system’s normative values operate in a realm distinct from the purported advances of 
modern science, the role of the judiciary is to enforce the boundary between law and 
science, while the role of the jury is to consider and decide the relevance of expert 
testimony regarding the defendant’s mental state. Psychology and psychiatry proceed from 
a set of assumptions regarding reason, instinct, emotion, and impulse that differ from “the 
instinctive sense of justice of ordinary men,” he wrote in Holloway; at the same time, 
“groups of distinguished scientists of the mind” frequently fail to reach consensus 
regarding the mental state of defendants because of their field’s complex, sensitive 
understanding of the mind.142 The problem of moral responsibility that the jury must 
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resolve, by contrast, allows no such complexity. 
These decisions appear at first glance to conflict with what one would expect from 
a progressive realist’s approach to the issue. But that would misjudge Arnold and his view 
of the judicial role. In Fisher, he asserted that “age old conceptions of individual moral 
responsibility cannot be abandoned” when juries determine the guilt of a defendant, 
“without creating a laxity of enforcement that undermines the whole administration of 
criminal law.”143 If those words had appeared in his academic work, they would have 
dripped with sarcasm—and indeed, recall that earlier he had ridiculed the “entertaining 
development” of a “parade of psychiatrists and alienists [appearing] before the bewildered 
jury.”144 To Professor Arnold, the jury was a symbol of all that was both perverse and 
necessary about the criminal trial; to Judge Arnold, forced to actually consider the 
implications of his theory for jury deliberations, the jury must rely upon “the instinctive 
sense of justice of ordinary men.”145 Accordingly, the jury—an imperfect institution that 
Professor Arnold noted was limited in its decision-making and deliberation by its 
members’ inadequate intelligence and susceptibility to emotional appeals—required 
protection from the advances (and pretensions) of the “scientists of the mind.” This view 
of the jury departs strikingly from Arnold’s view of the capacity and responsibility of the 
judge in his earlier decision in De Marcos v. Overholser, in which the D.C. Circuit held 
that a court may at its discretion initiate a psychiatric evaluation of a prisoner who petitions 
for release from involuntary psychiatric confinement on the ground that his mental health 
is restored.146 There, Arnold concluded, “a fair trial cannot be given in a case like this 
unless the court is permitted to avail itself of every opportunity which the law allows to 
consult scientific experts.”147 What could not be trusted to a jury in its determination of 
guilt, a judge could—and perhaps should—order and consider in determining a prisoner’s 
petition for release. 
Judge Arnold had applied the ideas of Professor Arnold.148 Both jurist and academic 
trusted the insights of modern, progressive science while each stepped back from radical 
reform in order to protect the flawed but essential institution of the jury. Judge Arnold had 
donned the judicial robe, seated himself at the appellate bench, and played his 
predetermined role. He had left behind his ironic and omniscient voice for the jurist’s 
gravitas and influence. It is no wonder, then, that he quit the play after only a brief time. 
It was left to his successors on the D.C. Circuit to experiment with the place of psychiatric 
testimony in the criminal trial and to grant juries more freedom to consider more complex, 
technical issues regarding a defendant’s sanity.149 Later still, the Circuit backtracked and 
                                                          
 143. Fisher, 149 F.2d at 29. 
 144. Arnold, Law Enforcement, supra note 1, at 20. 
 145. Holloway, 148 F.2d at 666. 
 146. De Marcos v. Overholser, 137 F.2d 698, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1943). 
 147. Id. at 699. 
 148. See Warren P. Hill, The Psychological Realism of Thurman Arnold, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 377 (1955). 
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 149. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874–76 (D.C. Cir. 1954), rev’d, United States v. Brawner, 
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thereby confirmed Arnold’s intuitive sense of the criminal justice system’s limits by 
returning to a more traditionally moralistic definition of insanity.150 The popular drama 
could not bear the weight of imperfect, complex modern behavioral sciences. As Arnold 
predicted, the necessity of the criminal justice system’s role as a social drama had trumped 
efforts to revise and reform it. 
 
                                                          
the roles of judge and jury in determining mental capacity and insanity as consistent with new rule). 
 150. See Brawner, 471 F.2d at 973 (adopting the Model Penal Code approach, which provides that “[a] person 
is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he 
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law.”); ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 102–03 (1967). See 
generally CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, ARTI RAI & RALPH REISNER, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 518–
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